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Uncharted Waters 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR’S FIGHT AGAINST PIRACY 
ON THE HIGH SEAS 
In the early morning of June 27, 2005, Captain 
Sellathurai Mahalingam was at the helm of the MV Semlow, a 
fifty-eight-meter-long cargo ship owned by the Kenya-based 
Motaku Shipping Agency.1 The ship, chartered by the United 
Nations, was thirty nautical miles off the coast of Somalia and 
contained 850 tons of rice for the victims of the December 2004 
tsunami.2 Suddenly, three small skiffs appeared, fired at the ship, 
and forced it to stop.3 At that point, somewhere between fifteen 
and twenty emaciated Somalis armed with pistols, AK-47s, and 
rocket-propelled grenade launchers boarded the ship.4 The pirates 
looted the captain’s safe and the crewmembers’ valuables and 
forced the ship to sail 100 miles northeast to the Somali capital of 
Mogadishu.5 There, Captain Mahalingam was forced to call the 
ship’s owner and demand a ransom of $500,000.6 Two months 
later, the crew, still in captivity, witnessed the hijacking of an 
Egyptian ship before the crews of both ships were again forced to 
sail elsewhere.7 Finally, the pirates were paid $135,000 ransom, 
and all the hostages were released unharmed.8 
This horrific scene of raiding, looting, and hostage-
taking has become increasingly common across the globe, but 
especially in the Gulf of Aden, off the Somali coast.9 The 
combination of a failed government in Somalia, a depleted 
  
 1 Peter Lehr & Hendrick Lehman, Somalia—Pirates New Paradise, in 
VIOLENCE AT SEA: PIRACY IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1, 1-3 (Peter Lehr ed., 
Routledge 2007); Edward Harris, U.S. Navy Muscles In on Old Foe: Pirates; Operations 
Off Africa Reflect Growing Threat, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2007, at A19. 
 2 Lehr & Lehman, supra note 1, at 2. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. at 3. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Abukar Albadri & Edmund Sanders, Somalia’s Pirate Problem Grows More 
Rampant, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008, at A1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2008/oct/31/world/fg-pirates31. 
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regional fishing industry, and a close proximity to significant 
shipping lanes makes the Somali coast a hotbed for pirate 
activity.10 Indeed, in a nation with a per-capita GDP of $600 
and an average male life expectancy of forty-seven, the 
$150,000 payout for a single hijacking is a lucrative alternative 
to poverty.11 As one hijacker admitted, “[w]hen evil is the only 
solution[,] you do evil.”12 The result has been an explosion of 
pirate raids on commercial vessels.13 While multinational naval 
forces in the Gulf of Aden thwarted some pirate attacks, there 
were a staggering 214 attacks and 74 hijackings in 2009.14 The 
number of reported pirate incidents has decreased slightly in 
2010.15 Between January and June of 2010, there were 196 
reported incidents, compared to 240 over the same period in 
2009.16 At any rate, those 196 reported incidents included 31 
hijackings, and resulted in 16 injuries, 1 death, and 597 
crewmembers taken hostage.17  
In addition to the substantial threat to human life, 
piracy has cost shipping companies between $13 billion and 
$16 billion.18 In 2008 alone, insurance costs for shipping 
companies increased ten-fold.19 In December 2009, pirates 
claimed they received a $4 million ransom payment from the 
Chinese government.20 One maritime security firm explained 
that, if left unaddressed, the costs of piracy to shipping 
  
 10 Id. 
 11 Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast 
of Somalia, 13 AM. SOC. INT’L L. INSIGHTS 2 (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.asil. 
org/insights090206.cfm. 
 12 James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Piracy Repression, Partnering and the Law, 
40 J. MAR. L. & COM. 43, 44 (2009). 
 13 Albadri & Sanders, supra note 9. 
 14 Mark McDonald, Record Number of Somali Pirate Attacks in 2009, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, at A9 (quoting statistics from the International Maritime 
Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Center as of Dec. 29, 2009), available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2009/12/30/world/africa/30piracy.html. 
 15 Pirates Face New Resistance as Navies Strike Back, Says IMB, ICC COM. 
CRIME SERVICES (July 15, 2010), http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option= 
com_content&view=article&id=418:pirates-face-new-resistance-as-navies-strike-back-
says-imb&catid=60:news&Itemid=51 [hereinafter Pirates Face New Resistance]. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Kraska & Wilson, supra note 12, at 45. 
 19 Jerry Seper, Blackwater Joins Fight Against Sea Piracy, WASH. TIMES, 
Dec. 4, 2008, at B1, available at http://washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/04/ 
blackwater-joins-fight-against-sea-piracy. 
 20 Corey Flintoff, A Record Year for Pirate Attacks, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 30, 
2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122066185. The Chinese 
government described the return of the ship as a “rescue.” Id.  
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companies will only increase.21 These costs, including added 
danger payments for crew members, higher ransom payments, 
and prolonged negotiations for hijacked ships, will lead to 
increasing prices for consumers.22 Although these costs are 
significant, maritime security commentators warn that pirate 
attacks remain too rare to generate meaningful attention from 
the governments of the world.23 In fact, less than one percent of 
all ships traveling through the Gulf of Aden is attacked by 
pirates.24 As such, at least in the short term, it will be left up to 
private sector firms to protect their ships, their cargo, their 
crew, and their bottom line. 
This note will examine two distinct contexts in which the 
private sector will have to combat the threat of piracy and the 
complex legal framework in which it must operate. Shipping 
companies should—and can—minimize the threat of piracy to 
commercial vessels while also taking adequate precautions to 
prevent both criminal and civil liability. States may also utilize 
private security companies to hunt down piracy without diverting 
important military resources.  
Part I of this note addresses the shortcomings of state 
protection against pirates and the need for the private sector to 
take a more active role in securing the high seas. Part II examines 
the rights and responsibilities of shipping companies in fighting 
piracy. Finally, Part III considers the possibility of using private 
security contractors to hunt down pirates and the potential 
liabilities for these firms.  
I. PUTTING THE BURDEN ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
A. Ancient Origins 
For centuries, combating piracy was substantially the 
prerogative of states.25 Since Ancient Roman times, pirates 
were deemed “common enemies of mankind” and were subject 
to universal jurisdiction.26 Some of the earliest known legal 
references to pirate raids date back to Justinian’s Digest in 529 
  
 21 Seper, supra note 19. 
 22 Id.  
 23 See Dennis M. Zogg, Why the U.S. Navy Should Not Be Fighting Piracy off 
Somalia (May 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Joint Military 
Operations Dep’t, Naval War College). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Max Boot, Pirates, Then and Now, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2009, at 94, 99. 
 26 Id. at 99. 
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AD.27 In 1698, Great Britain became the first nation to 
specifically criminalize piracy.28 The rise of global commerce 
and exploration made piracy as relevant as ever.29 As the 
Spanish explored and colonized the New World, they sent naval 
convoys across the Atlantic twice a year with their acquired 
treasures.30 Merchant ships not protected by the fleet sailed at 
their own risk.31 One of these ships, seized by Sir Francis 
Drake, was worth $18 million in today’s currency.32 
The United States, most notably, dealt with piracy in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in the North 
African Barbary States.33 The pirates, sanctioned by the 
Barbary States, posed such a threat to American merchant 
ships that the U.S. government entered into agreements to give 
ships safe passage in exchange for goods and cash.34 For 
example, an agreement made in 1795 transferred $1 million in 
goods and cash to the government of Algiers.35  
By 1801, President Jefferson recognized that “nothing 
will stop the eternal increase of demands from these pirates 
but the presence of an armed force.”36 The U.S. Navy fought the 
pirates until 1815, when the Barbary States finally agreed to 
stop attacking American ships—a concession that had been 
made to the British and French decades earlier.37 
  
 27 Zou Keyuan, New Developments in International Piracy Law, 8 CHINESE J. 
INT’L L. 323, 323 (2009); see also 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, Book 13, para. 18 (Alan 
Watson ed. 1998). 
 28  Keyuan, supra note 27, at 323. 
 29 See Douglass C. North, Sources of Productivity Change in Ocean Shipping, 
1600-1850, 76 J. POL. ECON. 953 (1968). 
 30 Keyuan, supra note 27, at 323. 
 31 Boot, supra note 25, at 100. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 102. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Treaty of Peace and Amity, U.S.-Algiers, Sept. 5, 1795, 2 U.S.T. 275. The 
treaty stated in relevant part:  
[I]f war vessels or merchant vessels belonging to our friend the American 
ruler meet on the open sea with war vessels or merchant vessels belonging to 
Algiers, and they become known to each other, they shall not be allowed to 
search or to molest each other, and that none shall hinder the other from 
wending its own way with honor and respect. Also, that whatever kind of 
travelers there are on board, and wherever they go with their goods, their 
valuables, and other properties, they shall not molest each other or take 
anything from each other, nor take them to a certain place and hold them up, 
nor injure each other in any way. 
Id. 
 36 Boot, supra note 25, at 102. 
 37 Id. 
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B. Lowering the Ship’s Guard 
From the sixteenth to late eighteenth century, adequate 
ship defenses were a necessary cost for shipping companies.38 
Ships would be armed like warships, with extra personnel and 
weaponry to fend off pirate attacks.39 In the early nineteenth 
century, these companies began to rethink arming their ships 
because of several factors.40 First, as competition among shipping 
companies increased during the Industrial Revolution, speed 
became a premium, and companies could not afford to weigh 
down their ships with ammunition and extra personnel.41 
Furthermore, busier shipping lanes patrolled by a strong British 
Navy led to a global decline in piracy.42 As a result, ships began 
to disarm, carrying fewer personnel and armaments.43 As 
Professor Douglass C. North, formerly of the University of 
Washington, observed, the increased security of shipping routes 
led to a steady decrease in maritime insurance rates, labor costs, 
and ammunition costs.44 He further noted that, in areas such as 
the West Indies, lingering piracy threats continued to translate 
into higher costs to shipping companies.45  
Shipping companies’ decisions to disarm their ships in 
favor of lower costs and increased efficiency became the norm 
from the nineteenth century until recently.46 Except during 
wartime, few ships carried armed guards or even ammunition.47 
The recent reemergence of pirates as a threat to merchant vessels 
has forced shipping companies to once again consider arming 
their ships.48 While shipping companies were initially hesitant, 
more and more have armed their ships because of the insufficient 
  
 38 John W. Miller, Loaded: Freighters Ready to Shoot Across Pirate Bow, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2010, at A9, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB126265833983415885.html. 
 39 Id.; see also North, supra note 29, at 960.  
 40 See Miller, supra note 38. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Deepak Lal, Will Terrorism Defeat Globalization?, in NO MORE STATES? 
GLOBALIZATION, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION, AND TERRORISM 36 (Richard N. 
Rosecrance & Arthur A. Stein eds., 2006). 
 43 North, supra note 29, at 960.  
 44 Id.  
 45 Id. at 959-60.  
 46 Miller, supra note 38. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
348 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
international response to piracy and recent reductions in 
insurance premiums for ships that carry armed guards.49  
C. The International Response 
The reemergence of piracy, especially the high-profile 
taking of the U.S.-flagged MV Maersk Alabama, has drawn 
some response from the international community.50 The United 
Nations, for example, has passed resolutions on the matter, 
and many of the world’s navies have devoted resources to the 
Gulf of Aden.51 Despite these measures, pirate attacks remain a 
considerable threat.52 As such, shipping companies, particularly 
in the short term, must not rely on governmental entities to 
keep their ships safe.53  
In the Gulf of Aden, warships from the United States, 
United Kingdom, Russia, China, India, South Korea, and several 
other nations have been deployed to fight piracy.54 For the most 
part, these multilateral efforts are controlled by the U.S. 
Combined Task Force 151 and the European Union’s Operation 
Atalanta.55 The U.S. Navy has established a “Maritime Security 
Patrol Area,” a heavily patrolled area that merchant vessels are 
encouraged to navigate.56 In addition to military collaboration, 
the United Nations has taken a leading role in coordinating 
global antipiracy policy through the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO).57 The IMO is an United Nations entity with 
168 member nations whose mission includes global coordination 
“for legal issues, technical co-operation, and maritime security 
including anti-piracy efforts.”58 
In 2008, the United Nations Security Council (“Security 
Council”) passed four resolutions that were significant to 
nations fighting piracy.59 Most notably, these resolutions 
allowed states to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and 
  
 49 Id. 
 50 See Zogg, supra note 23, at 7-8.  
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 9-12. 
 54 Id. at 1. 
 55 Id. at 8. 
 56 Id. at 10. 
 57 LAUREN PLOCH ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40528, PIRACY OFF THE 
HORN OF AFRICA 18 n.41 (2009). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Zogg, supra note 23, at 7.  
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urged states to commit naval vessels and aircraft to the Somali 
region.60 The Security Council’s resolutions certainly laid 
important groundwork for nations to combat piracy.61 Still, the 
resolutions only “urged” nations to commit resources to the 
fight against piracy.62 As Lieutenant Daniel Zogg of the U.S. 
Naval War College points out, there is presently little incentive 
for nations to do more to fight piracy.63  
Lieutenant Zogg suggests that pirate attacks remain a 
very rare phenomenon and will not receive the requisite 
attention necessary to provide optimal security, especially 
without a connection to terrorist groups.64 Less than one 
percent of all ships traveling through the world’s hot spot for 
piracy is attacked, and the $16 billion lost annually is a drop in 
the multi-trillion-dollar bucket that is international shipping.65 
The overall effectiveness of naval patrols is a problem in itself.66 
Patrol ships must cover 1.1 million square miles of ocean and 
must be able to respond to a hijacking within fifteen minutes, 
  
 60 Id. (quoting S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 7(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (June 2, 2008); 
S.C. Res. 1838, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 15, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1851 (Dec. 16, 
2008)). Zogg summarized the resolutions as such: 
UNSCR 1816 (June 2, 2008) authorized . . . [other states] to “enter the 
territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and 
armed robbery at sea.” 
UNSCR 1838 (October 7, 2008) urged “states interested in the security of 
maritime activities to take part actively in the fight against piracy on the 
high seas off the coast of Somalia, in particular by deploying naval vessels 
and military aircraft.” 
UNSCR 1846 (December 2, 2008) extended by twelve months the 
authorization initially established under UNSCR 1816 for foreign countries 
to pursue pirates into Somalia’s territorial waters. It also urged all “parties to 
the [1988] SUA [Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation] Convention to fully implement their obligations under 
said Convention . . . to build judiciary capacity for the successful prosecution 
of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of 
Somalia.” 
UNSCR 1851 (December 16, 2008) authorized for a period of twelve months 
states to “undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia,” 
essentially paving the way for attacks against piracy infrastructure ashore.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id.  
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 2. 
 66 Id. at 9.  
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the time it generally takes to hijack a ship.67 The Navy has 
projected that it would take sixty-one ships to adequately 
patrol a small corridor within the pirates’ operational space—a 
dramatic increase from the twelve to sixteen ships that 
currently patrol the corridor.68 While the current naval 
presence in the Gulf of Aden has lead to a slight decrease in 
pirate incidents, pirates have proven to increase their 
operational capabilities to up to 1000 nautical miles off the 
Somali coast, and their reach continues to grow.69 In 2009, the 
International Maritime Bureau reported twenty-eight attacks 
off the coast of Nigeria,70 and in July 2010, pirates attacks were 
reported north of the naval patrols’ reach in the Red Sea.71 
In addition to encouraging nations to join the fight 
against piracy, the Security Council resolutions made one 
mention of shipping companies.72 Resolution 1846 urges 
shipping companies, nations, and the International Maritime 
Organization to advise ships on “best practices” in dealing with 
pirate attacks.73 The International Maritime Bureau—a 
nonprofit organization not affiliated with the IMO—suggests 
that these practices include: 
[R]eview of the ship’s security plan (SSP), crew briefing and drills 
regarding emergency measures, an emergency communication plan, 
additional security watches, group transits, transits as far from 
territorial waters as possible, daytime transits through high-risk 
regions, as well as myriad practices in the event that an attack occurs.74  
Still, these suggestions are merely guidelines and, like 
any Security Council resolution, they are not binding on the 
shipping private sector.75 In short, absent a dramatic change in 
international policy, shipping companies will retain great 
  
 67 Id. Zogg’s 1.1 million square mile figure refers to the area in which the 
Somali pirates have displayed operational success. Id. 
 68 Id. at 11. 
 69 Pirates Face New Resistance, supra note 15. 
 70 Jon Gambrell, Nigeria: 12 Foreign Sailors Kidnapped by Pirates, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 3, 2010), http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ 
ALeqM5jFgtdm4PvHOfaFjZnYMcaAmrfvgD9GNJRVG2. 
 71 Adam Schreck, NATO Fears Somali Pirates Moving to South Red Sea, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 21, 2010), http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ 
ALeqM5gB7YMEDuCwwY9ncDOtPAkEI4-H2wD9H3I9884. 
 72 Michelle Nakamura, Piracy off the Horn of Africa: What is the Most 
Effective Method of Repression? 9 (May 4, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
Joint Military Operations Dep’t, Naval War College). 
 73 Id. at 9-10. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
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responsibility and broad discretion in securing their ships 
against pirate attacks.  
II. THE SHIPPING COMPANY 
While the international community struggles to craft 
policies to stabilize Northern Africa and eradicate piracy, it is 
clear that shipping companies will primarily be responsible for 
keeping their ships safe. Piracy has cost shipping companies, 
cargo owners, and ship owners billions of dollars over the last 
decade.76 Pointing out the numerous costs and considerations 
facing shipping companies, practitioner D. Joshua Staub writes 
in the Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 
If a shipping line must take a route around the Cape of Good Hope 
instead of through the Suez Canal, it will incur additional annual 
costs of $89 million. War risk insurance premiums for vessels 
transiting the Gulf of Aden could reach as much as $400 million 
per annum. A Saudi oil tanker forced to travel to the United States 
by way of the Cape of Good Hope will reduce its annual delivery 
capacity by 26% and expend an additional $3.4 million per year to 
bring its payload to market. These examples do not include 
emotional damages to hostages and their families, or special 
damages from loss of use of impounded vessels, lost cargo, ransom 
payments, difficulty in retaining mariners or increased cost of 
goods for consumers.77 
Shipping companies cannot ignore these observations. As 
pirates become stronger, bolder, and acquire more resources, 
shipping corporations will continue to pay a high cost of doing 
business. The decision to pay ransoms, the hiring of private 
security, and the adoption of increased safety precautions 
represent three complex legal issues that shipping companies 
must face in fighting piracy.  
A. Ransoms 
Unlike their predecessors, pirates of the twenty-first 
century do not have the capability or the desire to plunder the 
cargo of the hijacked ships.78 Their true capabilities lie not in 
  
 76 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 77 D. Joshua Staub, Letters of Marque: A Short Term Solution to an Age Old 
Problem, 40 J. MAR. L. & COM. 261, 262-63 (2009). 
 78 James W. Carbin, Pirates: Hostis Humanis Generis, 56 FED. L., Sept. 2009, 
at 50, 55. 
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the capture of ships but in the negotiations that follow.79 In fact, 
by 2009, ransoms paid for the release of cargo and crew 
approached $50 million.80 These payments have become so 
commonplace that they are factored into the general 
calculation of a ship’s liability.81 Like other liabilities, ransom 
payments are paid from a ship’s general average.82 The recent 
spike in piracy has required some carriers, cargo owners, and 
others who contribute to a ship’s general average to seek 
additional protection through insurance.83 Kidnapping and 
ransom (“K&R”) policies are now being extended to ships and 
their crew with rates increasing substantially.84 The payment of 
ransoms has become not only a general practice for shipping 
companies, but also a business in itself.85 
Ransom payments by private parties to pirates remains 
legal practice in countries such as the United States and Great 
Britain.86 The British legal system acknowledged the payment 
of ransoms as early as 1590.87 In Hicks v. Palington Moore’s, the 
court held that a ransom paid voluntarily by a master to 
ransom a ship and its cargo can and should be paid from the 
ship’s general average.88 Similarly, in the American legal 
tradition, James Carbin, a maritime law practitioner who 
advises shipping companies on paying pirate ransoms, points 
out, “The U.S. Supreme Court cited [Hicks] with approval in 
Ralli v. Troop . . . , and subsequent authorities have followed 
the analysis. Indeed, the Digest of Justinian, Rhodian Law, 
and Consolado Del Mare, which cover the sixth through the 
[fifteenth] centuries A.D., appear to endorse ransom as a 
General Average expense.”89 
  
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 54. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Jonathan Spencer, Hull Insurance and General Average—Some Current 
Issues, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1261 (2009). The doctrine of General Average is defined 
as “a rule allowing a carrier to require cargo owners and the shipowner to contribute 
pro rata to the cost of protecting the ship and its cargo.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 518 
(8th ed. 2004). 
 83 Spencer, supra note 82, at 1260. 
 84 Id. at 1259. 
 85 Id. at 1259-60. 
 86 See Fred C. Ikle & Stephen G. Rademaker, Coddling Pirates Aids 
Terrorists, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/ 
jan/11/coddling-pirates-aids-terrorists. 
 87 Hicks v. Palington, (1590) 72 Eng. Rep. 590 (K.B.). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Carbin, supra note 78, at 54 (citation omitted). 
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While paying ransoms has become common practice, 
commentators have indicated that refraining from doing so 
could actually deter piracy.90 Following the capture of a Saudi 
supertanker in November 2008, British Foreign Secretary 
David Miliband stated,  
There is a strong view of the British Government, and actually the 
international community, that payments for hostage-taking are only 
an encouragement to further hostage-taking and we will be 
approaching this issue in a very delicate way, in a way that puts the 
security and safety of the hostages to the fore.91 
Former American policymakers Fred C. Ikle and Stephen G. 
Rademaker suggest an international regime to prevent 
payment of pirate ransoms.92 They point to United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1373, which outlaws any financial 
support to terrorists and terrorist organizations.93 Of course, 
this ban, along with the American policy of not negotiating 
with terrorists, applies only to state actors.94 As the U.S. 
Department of State makes clear, “U.S. Government policy is 
to make no concessions to terrorist demands. However, such a 
decision on the part of private individuals or companies is a 
personal one and in some special circumstances may be made 
by the family or company of the victim.”95 Thus, companies, as 
private actors, can choose whether to pay the ransoms.96  
On its face, an international ban on paying pirate 
ransoms seems to be an important step in combating piracy.97 
Still, there are several problems with such a policy. Most 
strikingly, the payment of ransoms often makes good business 
  
 90 See, e.g., Ikle & Rademaker, supra note 86; Michelle Caruso-Cabrera, A 
Sure-Fire Cure for Pirate Hijackings, CNBC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www. 
cnbc.com/id/30109142. 
 91 Xan Rice & Matthew Weaver, Sirius Star Pirates Demand $25m Ransom, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/20/piracy-somalia; 
see also Brent Lang, Gates: Stop Paying Ransom to Pirates, CBS NEWS (Apr. 17, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/04/17/politics/politicalhotsheet/entry4952864.shtml 
(reporting on United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ speech to the United 
States Naval War College in which he referred to corporations paying pirate ransoms 
as “part of the problem”). 
 92 Ikle & Rademaker, supra note 86. 
 93 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 94 The United States Department of State re-affirmed this posture in a report 
by its Overseas Security Advisory Council. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OVERSEAS SEC. 
ADVISORY COUNCIL, SECURITY AWARENESS OVERSEAS: AN OVERVIEW (1991), available 
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/19792.pdf. 
 95 Id. at 13-14. 
 96 Id. at 14. 
 97 See PLOCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 10-11. 
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sense for a corporation.98 As the Congressional Research Service 
points out, shipping corporations today will often secure 
insurance policies that will cover ransom payments in the 
event of a hijacking.99 As such, these costs may be considerably 
lower than the cost of securing a vessel against pirate attacks.100 
Such costs could include rerouting ships, arming the vessel, 
and hiring private security.101 Defending the ship or counting on 
naval assistance also greatly increases the risk to the cargo and 
to human life.102 However, to date, few pirate attacks in the Gulf 
of Aden have turned deadly.103 Among the most notable 
casualties was the owner of a French sailboat who was killed in 
a gunfight between pirates and the French Navy.104 
Furthermore, the negotiated ransom is often minute compared 
to the substantial value of a ship’s cargo.105 The owners of the 
aforementioned supertanker, MV Sirius Star (carrying oil 
valued at $100 million), agreed to pay a ransom of $3 million to 
the pirates.106  
As such, in the short term, many shipping companies 
will continue to consider paying pirate ransoms.107 However, as 
the Wall Street Journal points out, increases in pirate attacks, 
ransom amounts, and insurance costs have forced many 
companies to reconsider defending their ships.108 More and 
more, companies are looking to private security and additional 
safety measures instead of acquiescing to the pirates.109  
B. Hiring Private Security 
1.  A Growing Industry 
Though the threat of piracy is a danger, it has not 
escalated to a point that would dramatically increase naval 
  
 98 Id. at 11. 
 99 Id. at 10-11. 
 100 Id. at 11. 
 101 Id. at 10-11. 
 102 Id. at 11. 
 103 Id. at 8. 
 104 Id. at 9. 
 105 Id. at 11; Miller, supra note 38. 
 106 See supra note 78 and accompanying text; Saudi Tanker ‘Freed Off 
Somali,’ BBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7820311.stm. 
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presence in the Gulf of Aden.110 As such, shipping companies have 
increasingly relied on private contractors to provide security for 
their ships and cargo.111 The U.S. State Department observed that 
“[i]n appropriate circumstances, onboard armed security, private 
or military, can provide an effective deterrent to pirates in the 
Horn of Africa region for certain vessels deemed to be at high 
risk.”112 Professor Claude Berube of the U.S. Naval Academy 
theorizes that private contractors may be used in two distinct 
contexts.113 First, private contractors can be hired by shipping 
companies to provide security on board their ships.114 Second, 
private contractors can be commissioned by the government to 
hunt down pirates.115 The former is quickly becoming a common 
practice for pirate-plagued shipping companies.116  
While some states have resorted to placing naval 
personnel on private ships, most shipping companies have 
turned to private security contractors.117 This practice is far 
from new.118 In the days of the British Empire, the British East 
India Company regularly subcontracted the protection and 
transport of goods to armed merchant ships.119 In the twenty-
first century, an entire industry is devoted to maritime 
security.120 Among the companies in this growing industry is 
  
 110 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
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British-based Eos Risk Management, which claims to have 
fended off fifteen attacks between January and August of 
2009.121 Eos, like most private contractors, employs ex-military 
personnel, often with strong naval experience.122 Their 
personnel is instructed to use non-lethal defenses, such as ear-
piercing acoustic weaponry and high-pressured water hoses, to 
repel pirate attackers.123 Security companies are hesitant to use 
lethal force, because it could cause pirates to better arm 
themselves and thus escalate hostilities.124 Moreover, as the 
United Kingdom-based Olive Group explained, pirate contacts 
in African ports can warn their comrades of which ships have 
security and should be avoided.125 Many firms share the view of 
Virginia-based Securewest International that the mere 
presence of contractors can scare away pirates.126 While this 
view has been the norm, more companies are considering the 
presence of armed guards.127 
Following its high-jacking in April 2009, the MV Maersk 
Alabama turned to an armed security team.128 Only seven 
months later, the ship was again attacked 300 miles off the 
Somali coast.129 This time, the contractors were able to 
successfully repel the attack.130 Slow, bulky ships, like the MV 
Maersk Alabama, are coming to realize that armed guards are 
an effective option.131 Insurance companies are providing 
further incentive.132 Companies such as Hiscox, Ltd. are offering 
fifty-percent reductions in shipping-company insurance rates to 
those that contract for armed security.133 In fact, these trends 
have led to new strategic partnerships between insurance 
brokers and maritime security firms. One of the world’s largest 
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insurance brokers, Marsh, has partnered with maritime security 
firm, REDfour, offering clients discounts in both insurance 
coverage and security services, when purchased together.134  
Blackwater Worldwide,135 which came to prominence for 
its controversial role in providing security services for the 
United States in Iraq, has also found opportunity in armed 
security.136 Rather than provide armed guards on merchant 
vessels, the company purchased and retro-fitted an 183-foot 
research vessel with “state-of-the-art navigation systems,” 
advanced communication systems, helicopters, a hospital, and 
a highly trained crew of forty-five.137 The ship, named the 
MacArthur, will offer patrols and security for its clients in lieu 
of armed guards aboard the merchant vessel.138  
The U.S. Maritime Administration, within the 
Department of Transportation, recently released an advisory 
that makes several recommendations when considering the use 
of private security forces.139 Most significantly, shipping 
companies must consider the legality of having armed security 
forces aboard and bringing them into foreign ports.140 Under 
American law, shipping companies are permitted to employ 
armed guards on ships. Section 383 of title 33 of the United States 
Code, titled “Resistance of Pirates by Merchant Vessels,” states, 
The commander and crew of any merchant vessel of the United 
States, owned wholly, or in part, by a citizen thereof, may oppose 
  
 134 Press Release, Marsh and REDfour Team to Help Shipowners Address 
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358 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
and defend against any aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or 
seizure, which shall be attempted upon such vessel, or upon any 
other vessel so owned, by the commander or crew of any armed 
vessel whatsoever, not being a public armed vessel of some nation in 
amity with the United States, and may subdue and capture the 
same; and may also retake any vessel so owned which may have 
been captured by the commander or crew of any such armed vessel, 
and send the same into any port of the United States.141 
The U.S. Supreme Court examined this statute in the classic 
piracy case, The Marianna Flora.142 Writing for the Court, 
Justice Story held that “[p]irates may, without doubt, be 
lawfully captured on the ocean by the public or private ships of 
every nation; for they are, in truth, the common enemies of all 
mankind, and, as such, are liable to the extreme rights of 
war.”143 Other nations, including Spain, have also passed laws 
that explicitly allow ships to carry armed guards.144 Meanwhile, 
nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia have outlawed the use 
of armed guards and have stated that these guards would be 
subject to arrest if found in territorial waters.145 Armed guards 
traveling through the territorial waters of Singapore are 
required to disassemble and lock their weapons.146 While hiring 
armed guards is becoming a more accepted practice, shipping 
companies face three legal hurdles in employing armed 
guards—weapons exportation laws, command and control 
issues, and potential liability for defending the ship. 
2. Regulation of Armed Guards 
a. “Weapons Trafficking” 
While their cargo might not be weaponry, ships carrying 
armed guards are subject to both international and domestic 
weapons-trafficking laws.147 Because shipping companies have 
increasingly turned toward private contractors, the U.S. Coast 
  
 141 33 U.S.C. § 383 (2006). 
 142 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1 (1826). 
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2010] UNCHARTED WATERS 359 
Guard (“Coast Guard”) has issued an advisory about 
compliance with American firearms laws.148 While armed 
guards are not “importing” and “exporting” their firearms to be 
sold in port, American flagged vessels must comply with 
American domestic law, including the Gun Control Act of 
1968149 and the National Firearms Act,150 as well as the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) set forth by 
the Departments of State and Justice.151 Shipping companies 
can comply by applying for a temporary export license, which 
allows the ship to import and export approved weapons for a 
four-year period and does not permit the transfer of weapons to 
other individuals.152 Armed guards could also carry their 
weapons under a personal-use exception of ITAR; however, this 
alternative severely limits the quantity of guns and 
ammunition that could be carried, and the exception would 
need to be reissued upon each entry.153  
Still, as the Coast Guard admits, this is far from the 
only obstacle to importing weapons.154 In addition to American 
law, shipping companies must comply with state and local laws 
as well as the laws of foreign ports.155 In testifying before the 
House Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation, Arthur J. Volkle, Jr., Vice President of 
America Cargo Transport, Inc.,156 explained that varying 
restrictions and prohibitions in domestic and foreign ports 
creates a significant burden on shipping companies.157 
Domestically, Volkle points out that temporary export permits 
are “impossible” to get, as they require authorization from all of 
the ports to which the ship will be traveling.158 As a result, 
vessels have the burden of constantly applying for personal 
effects exemptions for each of their armed guards.159 
Internationally, the lack of uniformity in the rules and 
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regulations of foreign ports overburdens the companies, and 
regulatory violations can delay the unloading of a vessel.160  
To address these problems, Volkle advocates several 
policy recommendations. Most notably, the United States, 
according to Volkle, should broker agreements with foreign 
governments that set forth uniform rules for the entry of ships 
with armed guards.161 In the interim, the United States should 
provide a clear list of the various requirements of foreign states 
for the entry of arms.162 Finally, Volkle asserts that there 
should be new regulations and procedures for licensing private 
security contractors and allowing them to carry firearms on 
board.163 These are worthwhile recommendations that would 
better equip the private sector to combat piracy while not 
requiring further commitment of military assets.  
b.  Command and Control 
Once the private contractors are on the vessel, for whom 
do they work? As most advocates for arming merchant ships 
would agree, shipping companies do not want to arm their own 
crews, but instead hire a private, third party to defend their 
ships.164 As such, there is currently some ambiguity in exactly 
who is in control of the private contractors once the vessel is at 
sea.165 In choosing to deploy their weapons, contracts with 
private security firms often only require the security force to 
consult the ship’s captain “if there is time.”166 Otherwise, the 
decision when to deploy and use weapons lies with the 
contractors.167 This outcome directly conflicts with the 
longstanding tradition of the supremacy of the captain while a 
ship is at sea.168 The International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), Regulation 34-1 states, 
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The owner, the charterer, the company operating the ship as defined 
in Regulation 1X/1, or any other person shall not prevent or restrict 
the master of the ship from taking or executing any decision which, 
in the master’s professional judgment, is necessary for the safety of 
life at sea and protection of the marine environment.169 
Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Richard Phillips, captain of the hijacked MV Maersk Alabama 
expressed concern with this conflict. He observed,  
[V]ery clear protocols would have to be established and followed. For 
example, as a captain, I am responsible for the vessel, cargo and 
crew at all times, but I am not comfortable giving up command 
authority to others, including the commander of a protection force. 
In the heat of an attack, there can be only one final decisionmaker.170 
Indeed, issues of command and control are crucial and without 
Congressional regulations, shipping companies must be careful 
in contractually ceding control from their captains to security 
contractors. 
c.  Limiting Liability for Defending the Ship 
Related to command and control, shipping companies 
and individual private contractors’ liability can stem from 
defending a ship. The U.S. House of Representatives is 
currently considering a bill that would limit liability for 
owners, captains, and mariners for their actions during a 
pirate attack. Introduced by Representative Lobiondo in July 
2009, the bill currently states, 
An owner, operator, time charterer, master, or mariner who uses force, 
or authorizes the use of force, to defend a vessel of the United States 
against an act of piracy shall not be liable for any injury or death 
caused by such force to any person participating in the act of piracy.171 
While it is perhaps unlikely for pirates to sue ships for the 
injuries, this bill is clear evidence that Congress recognizes 
that it can be good policy for ships to employ private security. 
Indeed, the deterrent provided by private contractors not only 
lessens the burden on the U.S. Navy, but it also keeps 
insurance costs down, protects mariners, and decreases the 
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likelihood of paying ransoms. Of course, this bill does not relate 
to injuries sustained by shipping company employees as a 
result of pirate attacks.172  
C. Potential Civil Liability for Shipping Companies 
Traveling through pirate-infested waters can also mean 
substantial civil liability for a corporation. Following the 
hijacking of the MV Maersk Alabama, the ship’s cook, Richard 
E. Hicks, brought suit against the ship’s owner, Maersk Line 
Ltd., and his employer, Waterman Steamship Corporation.173 
Claiming that the defendants failed to take adequate 
precautions when sending the ship through the Gulf of Aden, 
Hicks sought $75,000 for his injuries and his apprehension 
about returning to work.174 Hicks sued for negligence under the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002,175 the Jones 
Act,176 as well as general maritime and common law.177 Hicks’ 
broad spectrum of claims is clear evidence that shipping 
companies must be aware that potential liability—and limits in 
liability—for a pirate attack can come from several sources of 
law. Three notable statutes of which shipping companies should 
be aware are (1) the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 
2002 and (2) the Jones Act—both of which were pleaded in the 
Hicks case—and (3) the Shipowner’s Limited Liability Act. 
1. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 
The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) is a 
comprehensive piece of legislation that sets forth a host of 
responsibilities not only for ship owners and mariners, but also 
for the Coast Guard and U.S. Department of Homeland 
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Security.178 Ship owners are required to take certain measures, 
including: designating security officers for the vessel and 
company; overseeing proper personnel training; and ensuring 
vessel records are kept.179 They must also conduct a Vessel 
Security Assessment (VSA) and make a Vessel Security Plan 
(VSP) that must be approved by the Coast Guard.180 Approved 
vessels are certified with an International Ship Security 
Certificate.181 Finally, the MTSA holds owners responsible for 
compliance with Coast Guard directives relating to incident 
reporting as well as safety and security checks.182  
Noncompliance with these regulations can carry a 
$25,000 per day civil penalty and can also leave a corporation 
vulnerable to negligence claims, as seen in Hicks.183 Maritime 
negligence claims are similar to those on land. A plaintiff has 
the burden of showing four elements: (1) “[t]he existence of a 
duty” that imposes a legal obligation on a person “to protect 
others from unreasonable risks”; (2) a “breach of that duty by 
engaging in conduct that falls below the applicable standard or 
norm”; (3) a “reasonably close causal connection between the 
offending conduct and the resulting injury,” i.e., proximate 
causation; and (4) injury to the plaintiff.184 
Antonio J. Rodriguez, a former U.S. Naval captain and a 
current maritime law practitioner, observed that violations of 
the MTSA could be considered a breach of the standard to 
“protect others from unreasonable risks” and lead to liability.185 
Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in The TJ Hooper is a seminal 
case in maritime negligence law and is the leading authority on 
the widely accepted negligence rules relating to industry safety 
practices.186 In The TJ Hooper, two tug boats were deemed 
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negligent and responsible for the loss of two barges when the 
tugs traveled into a storm without radios, which would have 
warned them of the storm.187 While having radios on board was 
not an accepted industry custom at the time, Judge Hand held 
that “proper diligence” would have led the tugs to equip their 
ships with the proper safety precautions (i.e., radios).188 He 
noted further that regardless of how persuasive an industry 
usage, an industry may not establish its own tests for proper 
diligence.189 Instead, courts are required to make an objective 
determination of reasonable diligence.190  
In addition to negligence claims, Rodriguez also notes 
that violations of MTSA regulations could create grounds for 
negligence per se claims.191 As explained by the Third 
Restatement of Torts, a defendant is negligent per se when he 
“violates a statute that is designed to protect against the type 
of accident [his] conduct causes, and if the accident victim is 
within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect.”192 
As such, a seaman’s injury that stems from a shipping 
company’s violation of the MTSA would likely meet this 
definition, and the company could be deemed negligent even if 
it was acting reasonably.193 Conversely, full compliance with 
MTSA regulations and possession of a valid International Ship 
Security Certificate could be considered prima facie evidence 
that the vessel fulfilled its duty of care.194 
In the context of claims arising from pirate attacks, as 
seen in the Hicks case, the MTSA regulations in question will 
focus on shipping companies’ adequate safety precautions.195 As 
the MTSA includes several provisions for ship security, a 
plaintiff—likely a shipping company employee—could make a 
substantial case for per se negligence.196 Even if the ship has a 
valid International Ship Certificate, a plaintiff can look for a 
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shipping company’s noncompliance with Coast Guard 
directives relating specifically to ships traveling in high-risk 
waters.197 As mentioned above, violations of Coast Guard 
directives are deemed violations of the MTSA.198 Among these 
directives is MARSEC199 Directive 104-6 (Rev. 2), which was 
issued following the capture of the MV Maersk Alabama. This 
directive requires ship owners that travel in high-risk waters 
to undertake specific planning to deter and repel pirate 
attacks.200 A shipowner’s plan must include: 
a. Hardening the vessel against intrusions. 
b. Non-lethal methods of repulsing intruders. 
c. Ship operations & maneuvers to evade attack. 
d. Communications procedures: Internal protocol for internal 
shipboard communications & external communications before, 
during and after the incident. 
e. Protection of the crew. 
f. Procedures to take if the ship’s security is compromised. 
g. Procedures for crew in hostage situations. 
h. Company policy/procedures for confronting intruders. 
i. Training program establishing frequency for drills and exercises.201 
Ships must also travel within certain protected corridors of the 
Gulf of Aden and provide voyage plans to regional Coast Guard 
liaisons.202 While not required, ships are also advised to 
establish “safe havens” in which the crew can take refuge 
during an attack.203 Also, a ship may rig its hull with nets, soap, 
or barbed wire to make it difficult to scale.204  
In the case of the MV Maersk Alabama, a Vessel Safety 
Plan was submitted by Maersk to the Coast Guard that 
included many antipiracy procedures and was ultimately 
approved.205 While Hicks has yet to be decided, this certainly 
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would make a showing of per se negligence based on a violation 
of the MTSA less likely. Still, Hicks can prevail under a 
“standard” negligence formulation, as Judge Hand applied in 
The TJ Hooper.206 This requires the plaintiff to convince a jury 
that the ship owner knew or should have known that the 
security measures, approved by the Coast Guard, were 
insufficient to prevent his injury.207  
2. The Jones Act 
While the MTSA provides a host of rules and 
regulations intended to protect the ship, crew, and cargo, the 
Jones Act was intended specifically to ensure shipping 
companies provide safe working conditions for seamen.208 Under 
the Act, “a seaman injured in the course of employment” can 
bring a civil claim against his employer. Specifically, 
A seaman injured in the course of employment or, if the seaman dies 
from the injury, the personal representative of the seaman may elect 
to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against 
the employer. Laws of the United States regulating recovery for 
personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an action 
under this section.209 
The Fifth Circuit in Myles v. Quinn Menhaden Fisheries, Inc. 
held that an action under the Jones Act requires “a finding 
both of negligent breach of duty and proximate cause.”210 While 
this ruling might sound like a standard common law 
formulation of negligence, the Supreme Court has made clear 
that, in passing the Jones Act, “Congress did not mean that the 
standards of legal duty must be the same by land and sea.”211 In 
fact, the employer’s duty will be construed liberally under the 
Jones Act.212 
In the context of piracy, the Jones Act puts a heavy 
burden on the seaman’s employer to provide a safe working 
environment.213 The adequacy of the safety precautions in place 
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will likely determine whether the burden is met. It is likely 
that the satisfaction of MTSA standards will provide at least a 
framework for the reasonableness of the precautions. Beyond 
protecting the physical well-being of the crew, the Jones Act 
also opens the door for lawsuits relating to emotional distress. 
As the complaint in Hicks stated, “[p]laintiff sustained and 
suffered physical pain, mental anguish.”214 
Emotional distress stemming from raids on the high 
seas is a fairly unexplored area of the law.215 In 1975, when the 
SS Mayaguez was hijacked by the Khmer Rouge off the coast of 
Cambodia, members of the crew sued their employer, the ship’s 
owner, for negligent infliction of emotional distress.216 The crew 
claimed that the ship was negligently piloted too close to the 
Cambodian coast.217 The ship’s insurance carrier agreed to pay 
the crew without litigating.218 While the case of the SS 
Mayaguez was never litigated, recent developments in 
negligence law would likely have given the crew a cause of 
action. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, the Supreme 
Court determined the standard for evaluating claims for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress under the Federal 
Employer’s Liability Act (FELA).219 The court rejected the 
“physical impact” test, which only allowed collection of 
emotional damages for negligence when it was accompanied by 
bodily injury.220 Instead, the court adopted the “zone of danger” 
test, which imposes liability not only if there is bodily injury, 
but also when the defendant’s conduct puts the plaintiff in 
“immediate risk of physical harm.”221 
The Ninth Circuit, in Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 
addressed claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress in 
  
the Jones Act claim was only against employer Watermen Steamship Corp. and not 
against ship owner Maersk Lines Ltd. See Memorandum and Order, supra note 205, at 
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 214 Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Jury Demand, supra note 177, at 3-4 
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 215 Eric Danoff, Marine Insurance for Loss or Damage Caused by Terrorism or 
Political Violence, 16 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 61, 73 (2004).  
 216 Id. at 73, 80.  
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general maritime law.222 In Chan, a young girl, the daughter of 
an employee of the defendant, was on an inflatable raft that 
capsized after leaving a cruise ship. She was swept off the raft 
but watched two employees perish.223 The court first observed 
that, since the Jones Act incorporates FELA, the same 
common-law principles that endorse the “zone of danger” test 
should apply.224 The court then used the principles of the Jones 
Act to determine that the general maritime law also supports 
actions for negligent infliction of emotional distress.225 While the 
court declined to identify the precise test it used,226 two 
important principles were established in Chan. First, the girl’s 
witnessing of the two crewmembers dying after being swept off 
the raft was sufficient to put her in a zone of danger.227 Second, 
the court made particularly clear that the “zone of danger” test 
established in Gottshall should also apply to Jones Act cases.228 
While the law of emotional damages for hijackings on 
the high seas is unclear, emotional damages have been 
litigated in the context of airline hijackings.229 These cases 
followed a different liability scheme that departed from the 
Gottshall standards and might be considered an alternate 
framework for ship hijackings by pirates.230 Following the 
hijacking of Transworld Airlines Flight 741 in 1970, passengers 
brought suit for emotional damages against the airline.231 The 
court allowed plaintiffs whose emotional damages stemmed 
from bodily injury to collect damages.232 The court’s holding was 
not solely based on common law torts; it was also based on the 
Warsaw Convention, which regulates liability for the 
international carriage of passengers and cargo by commercial 
airlines.233 The court observed that the Warsaw Convention 
provides a presumption of liability for commercial carriers 
while also imposing a cap on damages.234 In a case related to the 
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 223 Id. at 1402. 
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same 1970 hijackings, the court pointed out that the liability 
regulations set forth by the Convention, originally in 1920, 
were to “nurture” the newly developing airline industry by 
capping damages to prevent devastating liability.235 To avoid 
prejudicing the travelers, who were also taking a risk, the 
airline companies were given the presumption of liability.236 The 
court noted that, while this scheme may be obsolete, it is still 
considered good law.237  
There are three key differences between the Jones Act 
and the Warsaw Convention’s imposition of liability for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. First, the Jones Act 
requires a more liberal “zone of danger” test, while the Warsaw 
Convention, as interpreted by American courts, requires bodily 
injury.238 Second, the Warsaw Convention imposes a 
presumption of liability on the carrier, while the Jones Act still 
requires a showing of negligence.239 Finally, the Warsaw 
Convention, and not the Jones Act, greatly caps damages.240 
These differences expose shipping companies to greater 
potential liability for emotional damages following a hijacking. 
Unlike the airlines, shipping companies do not have the benefit 
of a liability regime designed to foster growth and decrease risk 
to fledgling companies.241 Instead, shipping companies must 
rely on careful compliance with federal safety regulations to 
avoid negligence and therefore minimize their exposure to 
emotional damages.242 Compliance can translate into a 
presumption against liability. Still, like the airlines, there were 
legal principles established in shipping’s infancy that shipping 
companies can use to further limit liability. 
3. The Shipowner’s Limited Liability Act 
Limiting a ship owner’s liability for acts of the crew 
beyond the owner’s contemplation is a longstanding tradition of 
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common law.243 Following a decision holding a shipping 
company liable for smuggling by the ship’s master, several 
London merchants petitioned the House of Commons.244 In 
response, the House of Commons, in 1734, passed legislation 
that aimed “to promote the increase of the number of ships and 
vessels” and to prevent “the prejudice of the trade and 
navigation of [Great Britain].” The statute required the 
“knowledge or privity of the owner” to bring a claim.245  
These very same principles were accepted by the U.S. 
Congress in the Shipowner’s Limited Liability Act of 1851.246 
The Act limits ship owners’ liability for losses arising from 
“embezzlement, loss, or destruction of any property, goods, or 
merchandise shipped or put on board the vessel, any loss, 
damage, or injury by collision, or any act, matter, or thing, loss, 
damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred” without 
the knowledge or privity of the owner.247 As the House of 
Commons and the American judiciary have observed, this 
statute is crucial to maintaining and encouraging investment 
in the shipping industry by limiting an owner’s risk.248  
Most notably, the provisions of the Shipowner’s Limited 
Liability Act prevent the owner from assuming liability for the 
negligent actions of the crew.249 In Northern Fishing & Trading 
Co., Inc. v. Grabowski, the captain of a vessel, which was 
seaworthy at the commencement of its voyage, unreasonably 
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decided not to take shelter from extreme weather conditions.250 
The Ninth Circuit held that a ship owner could limit its 
liability because the injury resulted from unreasonable conduct 
by the captain, and the injury was not proximately caused by 
the vessel’s unseaworthiness.251 Relying on the Second Circuit’s 
opinion in The 84-H,252 the court reasoned that if no liability is 
traceable to the owner and the ship seemed seaworthy at 
embarkment,253 then the owner should be completely 
exonerated.254 If liability is found but the damage was incurred 
without the “privity or knowledge” of the owner, liability 
should at least be limited. While it is the plaintiff’s burden to 
show the owner’s negligence, if the defendant can show 
“seaworthiness at commencement of the voyage,” he is prima 
facie entitled to limited liability.255  
Similarly, in United States v. MV Big Sam, the pilot of 
the tanker MV Big Sam negligently collided with another 
tanker.256 Noting that the negligent conduct was beyond the 
knowledge and privity of the ship owner, the court released the 
owners of the MV Big Sam of any liability.257 Inherent in these 
cases is the important limitation that an owner’s failure to 
inspect the safety of the vessel and ensure its seaworthiness 
will prevent him from limiting liability. In the case of The 
Republic, the Second Circuit, drawing on English common law, 
held that a ship owner could not invoke the Shipowner’s 
Limited Liability Act when he had failed to discover a safety 
defect that later caused the accident.258  
In addition to the Shipowner’s Limited Liability Act, 
ship owners can use martime security regulations and Coast 
Guard antipiracy directives as guidance of how to limit their 
liability. Even if a shipping company cannot completely 
immunize itself against legal accountability, it can use the 
certifications and safety plans required by the MTSA to at least 
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limit its liability. A shipping company that properly files a VSA 
and VSP259 and is granted an International Shipping Security 
Certificate likely has a strong argument that the ship was safe 
and seaworthy at the commencement of its voyage. Similarly, a 
shipping company that follows Coast Guard directives and has 
implemented safety precautions in the event of pirate attack 
would be able to argue that an employee’s deviation from these 
plans would be beyond its “privity and knowledge.”260 For 
example, if a pilot negligently veers from the protected 
passageways and encounters a pirate attack, ship owners 
would likely be able to limit liability. Also, if a crewmember 
departs from the ship’s procedure of meeting in its established 
safe haven, a shipping company might also be able to limit 
liability.  
Generally, the current liability regime for shipping 
companies sets forth an effective “carrot-and-stick” approach. If 
shipping companies follow the provisions of the MTSA and the 
directives of the Coast Guard, they are given substantial 
presumptions against liability that would exonerate them 
under the MTSA, the Jones Act, and maritime negligence—or 
at least limit their liability. If shipping companies do not follow 
these provisions, however, they are subject not only to 
substantial presumptions of liability, but also to civil penalties. 
As a matter of policy, this approach will have three 
important benefits in combating Somali piracy. First, the 
refusal to pay ransoms combined with increased security on 
ships could help deter acts of piracy without any further 
support from states. Second, it promotes stability in shipping 
markets. While implementing defensive measures on ships can 
be costly up front, shipping companies will be less likely to 
have to sporadically pay large ransom payments. Furthermore, 
the successful deterrence of pirate attacks could lead to a long-
term decrease in costs for shipping companies due to lower 
insurance premiums and decreased need to reroute ships. 
Third, the current approach emphasizes the safety of the 
captain and the crew. Without a strict regime that regulates 
the payment and ransoms and ship security measures, the 
safety of those aboard would be left to the business judgment of 
the ship owner. By imposing substantial penalties and a 
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considerable liability regime, ship owners effectively must 
chose safety.  
While this is perhaps an economically inefficient 
rationale, the risk of death, injury, and psychological suffering 
that comes from a ship’s hijacking is too substantial to justify 
this approach. While shipping companies are increasingly 
doing their share to combat piracy, another industry stands 
ready to profit in eradicating pirates from the Gulf of Aden. 
III. PIRATE HUNTERS 
Shipping companies are not the only players in the fight 
against piracy. The reemergence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden 
has sparked an industry of private contractors who stand ready 
to not only protect ships from pirate raids, but also to hunt 
down pirates.261 As the United States is caught fighting wars 
against terrorism and drugs, the military does not have the 
assets to adequately protect commercial shipping from pirates. 
Commentators suggest the U.S. government should turn to the 
private security industry.262 In doing so, however, these private 
companies face a host of legal challenges.263 Among the most 
notable are the legal authorization to hunt pirates and the 
potential criminal and civil liability that these companies could 
face. 
A. Historical Context 
Reliance on the private sector to hunt down pirates is 
not a new concept. Prior to the development of large-scale 
navies, countries would commission merchant vessels using 
instruments known as “letters of marque and reprisal” to 
attack enemy ships.264 These private sailors would come to be 
known as “privateers” and the practice of “privateering” 
became increasingly commonplace.265 At that time, Algiers alone 
had over one hundred ships and thousands of sailors engaged 
in privateering.266 Of course, as privateering became more 
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commonplace, government attitudes changed toward the 
practice, and rather than attack enemy ships, privateers were 
hired by countries including Great Britain and the United 
States to hunt down pirates.267 Among these privateers was 
Captain William Kidd, who, in 1696, received a royal 
commission to apprehend specific pirates wanted by King 
William III, as well as “all other Pirates, Free-booters, and Sea 
Rovers of what Nature soever.”268  
B. Legal Basis for the Letter of Marque 
The practice of privateering continued until it was 
outlawed by many nations through the 1856 Treaty of Paris 
and the 1907 Hague Convention.269 The United States was not 
among the signatories of either, and thus has not foreclosed the 
possibility of using privateers.270 Still, over the last century, the 
letter of marque has fallen out of use, largely due to the 
modernization and centralization of war efforts in the 
industrialized world.271 This, of course, does not mean that 
Congress has lost its power to grant them. As former naval 
officer David Douglas Winters observed, “Much like our 
Revolutionary War forefathers, we do not have the assets we 
need to protect ourselves. They found an answer, and 
fortunately they preserved it for us: privateers.”272  
Indeed, letters of marque were an important part of 
American life at the founding.273 During the Constitutional 
Convention, the inclusion of a Congressional power to grant 
letters of marque was among the few powers on which the 
federalists and antifederalists could agree.274 Article I, Section 8 
states in relevant part that “[t]he Congress shall have power . . . 
[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and 
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”275 
Exercising this power, Congress passed 33 U.S.C. § 386: 
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The President is authorized to instruct the commanders of the 
public-armed vessels of the United States, and to authorize the 
commanders of any other armed vessels sailing under the authority 
of any letters of marque and reprisal granted by Congress, or the 
commanders of any other suitable vessels, to subdue, seize, take, 
and, if on the high seas, to send into any port of the United States, 
any vessel or boat built, purchased, fitted out, or held as mentioned 
in section 385 of this title (pirate vessels).276 
As such, the President is authorized to enlist private citizens 
granted letters of marque to seize pirate vessels on the high 
seas.277 Individuals granted letters of marque are given 
significant authority to engage in hostilities against pirates.278 
The letter of marque would allow the ship to bear arms, and 
upon the capture of pirates, the ship’s master would be 
permitted to arrest the pirates and seize the pirates’ vessel.279 To 
preserve this authority, the ship must have received a completed 
letter of marque that identifies the vessel and its master.280 In 
addition, the master would be liable for the actions of his crew 
and responsible both for keeping detailed records and for 
complying with American and international humanitarian law.281 
Ships that exceed the bounds of their commission would lose 
these privileges and be punished as pirates.282 
Commentators suggest that the modern privateer would 
be able to work within these limitations while taking 
advantage of cutting-edge technology, a faster procurement 
process, and a more flexible organizational structure, as 
compared to the government.283 In 2005, the Department of 
Defense spent one third of its total budget on private 
contractors, and therefore it has the infrastructure and 
expertise to properly manage privateers.284 Much like military 
contractors in Iraq, privateers would be connected by a 
command/intelligence fusion center that could be operated by 
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the Coast Guard.285 Drawing further parallels to Iraq, Professor 
Berube suggests that letters of marque may not even be 
necessary to employ private contractors.286 Instead, he suggests, 
private contractors could be used to fill gaps in the United 
States’ overly stretched naval deployment, in tandem with an 
embedded Coast Guard Officer aboard to ensure compliance 
with international law.287 
The employment of modern day privateers in the Gulf of 
Aden could lead to substantial improvement in the security of 
the region and represents a lucrative new niche for the private 
security establishment. Companies have already invested 
heavily in this prospect; for example, Blackwater Worldwide 
recently developed its antipiracy ship, the MacArthur.288 Still, 
the risks to these companies are great.289 The law of 
privateering has been consistent, and privateers who exceed 
the bounds of their commissions risk being arrested and 
subjected to severe penalties for piracy.290 This risk would likely 
be even greater for contractors that are not commissioned. 
Unlike private contractors on land, private contractors on the 
high seas can be deemed pirates by any nation, and arrested 
and prosecuted.291 As such, it would be in the best interests of 
both private contractors and the U.S. government to grant 
letters of marque to private contractors before partnering with 
them in fighting piracy.  
C. Limitations on the Letter of Marque and Criminal 
Sanctions 
Letters of marque can and have placed strict limitations 
on the actions of privateers, and the American legal system has 
several mechanisms to deal with those that go beyond the 
bounds of a letter of marque.292 Many of these limitations were 
noted by Justice Story in The Amiable Isabella, one of the most 
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well-known cases in the realm of letters of marque.293 Story laid 
out several statutory restrictions that come with an issuance of 
a letter of marque. Notably, the Prize Act of 1812, as cited by 
Justice Story, states, “[A ship’s master is] to give bond, and is 
made responsible for his own misconduct and that of the crew; 
is to receive and execute the President’s instructions; [and] is to 
keep a journal of the ship’s transactions.”294 Failure to abide by 
these instructions would result in forfeiture of the commission 
and the rights to any prize.295 The Prize Act of 1812 further 
required ships to abide by the laws and treaties of the United 
States and to be responsible for any injuries beyond the 
purposes of the vessel.296 As mentioned above, violation of these 
  
 293 In his opinion, Justice Story reproduces the entire letter of marque: 
James Madison, President of the United States of America, to all who shall 
see these presents, greeting: Be it known, that in pursuance of an act of 
Congress, passed on the 26th day of June, one thousand eight hundred and 
twelve, I have commissioned, and by these presents do commission, the 
private armed schooner called the Roger, of the burthen of 184 tons, or 
thereabouts, owned by Thomas E. Gary, Hy. Gary, James B. Cogbill & Co., 
Brogg & Jones, Hannon & High, Robert Ritchie, Robert Birchett, John 
Wright, Wm. C. Boswell, Samuel Turner, John G. Heslop, Wm. & Charles 
Carling, Thomas Shoe, Richard B. Butte, Richard Drummond, Littlebury 
Estambuck, John Davis, Spencer Drummond, Peter Nestell, and Roger 
Quarles, mounting fourteen carriage guns, and navigated by ninety men, 
hereby authorizing Captain—, and John Davis, Lieutenant of the said 
Schooner Roger, and the other officers and crew thereof, to subdue, seize, and 
take any armed or unarmed British vessel, public or private, which shall be 
found in the jurisdictional limits of the United States, or elsewhere, on the 
high seas, or within the waters of the British dominions, and such captured 
vessel, with her apparel, guns and appurtenances, and the goods or effects 
which shall be found on board the same, together with all the British persons 
and others, who shall be found acting on board, to bring within some port of 
the United States; and also to retake any vessels, goods, and effects, of the 
people of the United States, which may have been captured by any British 
armed vessels, in order that proceedings may be had concerning such capture 
or recapture, in due form of law, and as to right and justice shall appertain. 
The said _____ is further authorized to detain, seize, and take all vessels and 
effects, to whomsoever belonging, which shall be liable thereto, according to 
the law of nations, and the rights of the United States, as a power at war, 
and to bring the same within some port of the United States, in order that 
due proceedings may be had thereon-this commission to continue in force 
during the pleasure of the President of the United States, for the time being. 
Given under my hand, and the seal of the United States of America, at the 
City of Washington, the 24th day of April, in the year of our Lord one 
thousand eight hundred and thirteen, and of the Independence of the said 
States the thirty-seventh. (Signed) JAMES MADISON. By the President, 
(Signed) JAMES MONROE, Secretary of State. 
Id. at 2-3. 
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requirements would leave the privateer vulnerable to arrest 
and prosecution for piracy.297 
1. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 
In addition to these longstanding consequences, Congress 
has passed legislation relating to the conduct of private 
contractors in response to the use of private contractors during 
the war in Iraq. The key piece of legislation relating to criminal 
liability for private contractors is the Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act of 2000.298 In relevant part, the Act states that 
anyone who “engages in conduct outside the United States that 
would constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for 
more than one year if the conduct had been engaged in within 
the . . . jurisdiction of the United States” while employed or 
accompanying the Armed Forces or as a member of the armed 
forces “shall be punished for the offense.”299  
Recently, the actions of private contractors in Iraq have 
greatly broadened the scope of the Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act of 2000. The most notable cases relate to the 
shootings in Nissour Square, Baghdad, Iraq, in September 
2007.300 While providing security for U.S. Embassy personnel, 
Blackwater contractors improperly opened fire in the open 
square, leaving fourteen Iraqis dead.301 One of the contractors, 
Jeremy Ridgeway, has pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter 
in a federal district court in the District of Columbia302 based on 
allegations that he “was employed by the Armed Forces outside 
the United States, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) (Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act).”303 This determination made 
Ridgeway subject to the laws of the United States.304 Five of 
Ridgeway’s colleagues were also indicted for voluntary 
manslaughter and charged under 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1).305  
  
 297 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 4 (1827). 
 298 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2006). 
 299 18 U.S.C. § 3261. 
 300 See Guard’s Plea Led to Blackwater Indictments, CBS NEWS (Dec. 9, 2008), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/12/09/national/main4657323.shtml. 
 301 Id. 
 302 Id. 
 303 Information at 1, United States v. Ridgeway (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2008), Criminal 
No. 08-341-01, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/us-v-ridgeway2.pdf. 
 304 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267. 
 305 Guard’s Plea Led to Blackwater Indictments, supra note 300. Charges were 
dropped against the five guards on December 31, 2009. See Charlie Savage, Judge 
Drops Charges from Blackwater Deaths in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2009), 
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The precedent established in the Ridgeway case could 
have strong ramifications for potential criminal liability for 
individual private contractors in the Gulf of Aden. In addition 
to risking potential prosecution for piracy, these contractors 
can be convicted for violating American law under the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000.306 As seen in the case 
of the Blackwater guards, there is an additional risk of severe 
penalties if the guards are armed with automatic weapons—a 
circumstance that could expose them to aggravating sentencing 
factors.307 As such, it is crucial for private security companies to 
properly stay within the bounds of their commissions and have 
clear mechanisms for command and control, both of which 
ensure compliance with American law. Failure to do so could 
lead to not only criminal penalties for their employees, but also 
civil liability for their organizations.  
2. Civil Liability 
Like the imposition of criminal liability using the 
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, the United States’ 
use of private contractors in Iraq has also led to new 
developments in civil liability for private contractors.308 The 
current framework for civil liability was born out of the Abu 
Ghraib prison scandal.309 Following the scandal, a class of Iraqi 
prisoners brought private actions against two contractors who 
provided translation and interrogation support—Titan Corp. 
and CACI International, Inc. (“CACI”)—for their roles in the 
scandal.310 The Iraqis brought suit in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia under the Alien Tort Statute, the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 
  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/us/01blackwater.html. Not addressing the merits 
of the charges, District Judge Urbina held that statements taken from the defendants 
by the government violated their rights against self-incrimination. Id. 
 306 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267. 
 307 Guard’s Plea Led to Blackwater Indictments, supra note 300. Since the 
guards committed their crimes using machine guns, they were subject to thirty year 
mandatory minimums. Id. 
 308 See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 309 See id. at 1. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal refers to allegations of torture 
and mistreatment of prisoners perpetrated by United States Army interrogators in an 
Iraqi prison beginning in 2004. The United States Military investigated the private 
contracting firms Titan Corp. and CACI International, Inc. Julian Borger, U.S. 
Military in Torture Scandal, GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2004), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
media/2004/apr/30/television.internationalnews. 
 310 Saleh, 580 F.3d at 2. 
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and state tort law claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act.311 
The district court dismissed the federal claims, and the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.312 Dismissing 
the liability claim under the Alien Tort Statute, the court held 
that the actions of the defendants, while under the color of 
state authority, were still done by private actors (not official 
actors) and therefore were not actionable.313 Dismissing the 
RICO claim, the court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing 
to seek civil remedies under the Act because they could not 
allege damage to business or property.314   
Turning to the merits of the state tort law claims, the 
district court had to determine whether the defendants were 
exempt from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act.315 The 
district court granted summary judgment for Titan Corp., 
holding that, since its command structure was fully integrated 
with that of the military, its employees were “soldiers in all but 
name,” and therefore it fell under the “combatant activities” 
exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act.316 This exception 
provides tort immunity for defendants “under the direct 
command and exclusive operational control of the military 
chain of command” who are “engaged in ‘activities both 
necessary to and in direct connection with actual hostiles.’”317 
By contrast, the district court held that CACI was not entitled 
to summary judgment, since it granted its managers additional 
discretion and supervision over their employees, thus creating 
dual chains of command.318 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit, reversed the District 
Court’s denial of summary judgment as to CACI and affirmed 
  
 311 Id. at 3; see also D.C. Circuit Rules that Preemption Requires Dismissal of 
Tort Claims Against Battlefield Contractors, 51 GOV’T CONTRACTOR 35, Sept. 23, 2009, 
at ¶ 324. The Federal Tort Claims Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2006). The 
Act regulates tort liability and immunity for employees of the federal government. See 
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 186, at 440-41. 
 312 Saleh, 580 F.3d at 2. 
 313 Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Ibrahim 
v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005)). Saleh and Ibrahim were both 
prisoners and both brought suit against Titan and CACI. Since their cases followed the 
same facts, the cases were consolidated for discovery purposes. As such, various case 
citations will refer to Saleh or Ibrahim as the named plaintiff. Both citations refer to 
the same litigation. See Ibrahim v. Titan Corp, 556 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2007).  
 314 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006); Saleh, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (citing Ibrahim, 
391 F. Supp. 2d at 10). 
 315 Ibrahim, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 3-4. 
 316 Id. 
 317 Id. at 4 (citing Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1948)). 
 318 Id. at 10-11. 
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summary judgment as to Titan Corp.319 The court rejected the 
District Court’s use of a narrow “direct command and exclusive 
operational control” test as inconsistent with Supreme Court 
precedent and bad policy.320 The D.C. panel noted that the 
court’s decision in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. stood for 
broader protection of the federal interests inherent in the 
exceptions to the Federal Torts Claims Act.321 In Boyle, the 
Court struck down the Eleventh Circuit’s decision that a 
contractor who was minimally involved in the design of a 
military helicopter did not fall within the “discretionary 
function” exemption of the Federal Tort Claims Act.322 The 
Boyle court made clear that government officials were still 
involved in making judgments about the design and therefore 
the tort claims were barred.323  
The D.C. Circuit in Saleh made similar findings. The 
court noted that freeing military commanders from worrying 
about potential tort claims when planning operations is a 
significant federal interest inherent in the “combatant activities” 
exception.324 Drawing on Boyle, the court agreed that even 
“limited influence on an operation” supports the interest in 
baring claims.325 The court further noted, as a matter of policy, 
that contractors would be less inclined to report abuses to their 
superiors and the government.326 The panel referred to the 
District Court’s recognition that contractors had to report abuses 
up both the corporate and military chains as evidence of a dual 
chain of command.327 Instead, the court set forth a broader test 
for preemption under “combatant activities” exception:  
During wartime, where a private service contractor is integrated into 
combatant activities over which the military retains command 
authority, a tort claim arising out of the contractor’s engagement in such 
activities shall be preempted. We recognize that a service contractor 
might be supplying services in such a discrete manner—perhaps even in 
a battlefield context—that those services could be judged separate and 
apart from combat activities of the U.S. military.328 
  
 319 Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 320 Id. at 8-9. 
 321 Id. (citing Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 513 (1988)). 
 322 Id. (citing Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513).  
 323 Id. (citing Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513). 
 324 Id. at 7.  
 325 Id. at 8-9. 
 326 Id. at 9. 
 327 Id. at 4-5. 
 328 Id. at 9. 
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Applying this test, the panel reversed and held that both Titan 
and CACI were exempt from the state tort claims.329  
Working under the color of American authority enables 
both criminal and civil sanctions to be brought against private 
contractors in the Gulf of Aden. To avoid civil liability, private 
contractors must heed the test established in Saleh. Beyond a 
commission, private security companies must insist on being 
integrated into the military’s antipiracy operations. Integration 
into the command structure not only helps to limit civil liability, 
but as Professor Berube points out, it allows private contractors 
to share intelligence and the military to effectively coordinate 
operations.330 Even with full integration, there is no guarantee 
that courts will consider combating piracy a “wartime” activity, 
and therefore leave private security firms open to liability.331 As 
such, just as Congress is attempting to pass legislation that 
limits the liability of ship owners when defending their ships,332 
Congress should also pass legislation that limits liability of 
private contractors who actively hunt for pirates. 
CONCLUSION 
The reemergence of pirates as a significant threat to 
commercial shipping is forcing the legal systems of the world to 
adapt. Since the United States cannot devote naval resources 
to protecting the merchant fleet the way it once could, it should 
craft policy and legislation that enables the private sector to 
fight piracy. The United States should continue to provide 
incentives for shipping companies to adequately protect their 
ships through increased exposure to civil liability, while 
attempting to regulate the paying of ransoms. This approach 
would deter pirate attacks, promote stability in shipping 
markets, and protect mariners from being looted, kidnapped, 
and ransomed. The United States should also look to private 
contractors to supplement its naval presence in the Gulf of 
Aden. These contractors can be regulated by an evolving legal 
regime that includes centuries-old, common-law principles as 
well as recent developments, both of which ensure criminal and 
civil sanctions for contractors who go beyond the bounds of 
  
 329 Id. at 10-11. 
 330 See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
 331 The test set forth in Saleh is prefaced with the clause “[i]n wartime.” 
Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9. 
 332 See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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their commissions. Following these two approaches, the United 
States can ensure the safety of its shipping industry while 
preserving its military commitments around the globe. 
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